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N response to the recent outburst in social media usage, courts have
struggled as how best to treat discovery of information contained
within these sites. From pictures to wall posts to status updates, peo-
ple feel a new comfort in sharing masses of intimate information within
the confines of the sites-information which often would not have been
shared so readily or spread so easily before the explosion of the social
networking medium. Although the creators of the social networking sites
(SNS) publicize that there can be no guarantee that information does not
become "publicly available,"' many users continue to hold on to at least a
subjective expectation of privacy. Perhaps the expectation of privacy has
something to do with the intricate privacy settings available for site users
to manipulate. Whatever the case, people's new willingness to post the
intimate details of their lives on the Internet provides a large source of
information that attorneys zealously try to obtain through the discovery
process. In recent months, U.S. courts have issued numerous inconsistent
holdings regarding the discovery of SNS information, reflecting the cur-
rent high levels of confusion in the area. This Comment seeks to set forth
a more coherent approach for courts to use in the future so that courts
can apply the law in a consistent fashion and so that litigants and their
lawyers can better ex ante understand the law. This Comment begins by
discussing the nature of SNS as well as examining the historic role of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and their application to SNS
information in Part II. Part III seeks to examine the current convoluted
state of jurisprudence surrounding the discoverability of SNS informa-
tion. Finally, Part IV determines if and how privacy expectations should
play a role in the analysis of whether SNS information should be discov-
erable. In addition, Part IV recommends a cohesive and uniform method
for courts to follow in the future to extinguish the recent, confused juris-
prudence surrounding SNS discovery. The method requires courts to
draw distinctions between public information and private information,
scrutinize whether the information is sought from the third party SNS
provider or the actual SNS user directly, and place more emphasis on the
role of relevance in discovery.
1. Privacy Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited Aug.
4, 2011) (stating "[a]lthough we allow you to set privacy options that limit access to your
information, please be aware that no security measures are perfect or impenetrable").
Mark Zuckerberg has stated in interviews that privacy is "no longer a 'social norm"' and
that "[p]eople have really gotten comfortable not only sharing more information and dif-
ferent kinds, but more openly and with more people." Emma Barnett, Facebook's Mark
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II. BACKGROUND
A. SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES
Social networking sites, also known as social media sites, are websites
where registered users have the ability to log in and form connections
both personally and professionally with other users. 2 Through "friend-
ing" others and joining interest groups, members create linkages to other
users based on similar interests and connections.3 The sites allow people
to view connections among people that might otherwise be unclear.4
Once a user joins a SNS, he can use the site to "search for friends, blog,
discuss topics in message forums, explore new music, view film trailers
and comedy clips, join groups, plan events, advertise a business, and
many more activities. ' '5
In recent years, SNS usage has increased exponentially. 6 Facebook and
MySpace constitute two of the most popular SNS with more than 700
million users and 80 million users respectively. 7 According to a recent
Nielsen Report, as of June 2010, Americans spent nearly one-fourth of
their total Internet time on SNS.8 This is a 43% increase in the amount of
time spent on SNS from June 2009, just one year prior.9 According to
Facebook, 50% of its users log in to their account at least once per day,
and more than 30 billion pieces of content are shared each month on its
site alone. 10 Each user that fills out a relatively complete profile will list
almost forty pieces of personal information, including everything from
"name; date of birth; educational and employment history; sexual prefer-
ences and relationship status;" to "online and offline contact information;
political and religious views; tastes in music, books, and movies; and of
course, photos."" The widespread use of the sites, combined with the
large amount of content posted on the sites,12 creates the perfect hunting
ground for discovery, especially since people often post candid, un-
guarded, and personal information on the sites. 13
2. Steven C. Bennett, Civil Discovery of Social Networking Information, 39 Sw. L.
REV. 413, 414 (2010).
3. Id.
4. JOHN G. BROWNING, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO SOCIAL NETWORKING 17-18
(2010).
5. Id. at 19.
6. Id. at 17.
7. Top 15 Most Popular Social Networking Sites, EBIzMBA, http://www.ebizmba.
com/articles/social-networking-websites (last updated Oct. 5, 2011).
8. What Americans Do Online: Social Media and Games Dominate Activity, NIELSEN
WIRE (Aug. 2, 2010), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/onlinemobile/what-americans-
do-online-social-media-and-games-dominate-activity/.
9. Id.
10. Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last vis-
ited Aug. 6, 2011).
11. BROWNING, supra note 4, at 20.
12. Id. at 105-06.




B. PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS IN THE WORLD OF SOCIAL NETWORKING
So why is it that users feel so comfortable posting the private details of
their life in such a public forum? One reason, a scholar has pointed out,
is that sites like Facebook create an "intimate, confidential, and safe set-
ting" which breeds a natural ground for socialization.14 Many SNS users
rationalize their behavior based on the assumption that since 500 million
other people have engaged in the same activities, the activities must be
safe and their personal information must be protected.' 5 Furthermore,
some may have a diminished fear of sharing their personal information
because they feel it is unlikely they would get picked out of a crowd of
over 500 million active Facebook users for their individual indiscretions, a
phenomenon commonly referred to as the "safety in numbers"
rationale. 16
Besides the reasons explained above, people may also feel a false sense
of security in the details they post on SNS due to the intricate privacy
controls available on the sites.17 On Facebook, a user can choose
whether his profile can be viewed by all 500 million users, by users age 18
and older, or by "friends only.' i8 Furthermore, the social media sites
contain particularized settings that control exactly who can access specific
areas of the user's profile, such as personal information, wall posts, and
photos.19 Because of the availability of detailed privacy controls, users
may feel they are effectively blocking any unwanted viewers from acces-
sing their information, and therefore, they maintain at least some expec-
tation of privacy. 20 Whether this expectation is reasonable, however, is
another question, especially in light of Facebook's privacy policy that ex-
pressly warns users that it cannot guarantee information posted on the
site will not become "publicly available."' 21
C. SHOULD SNS BE CONSIDERED ELECTRONICALLY STORED
INFORMATION UNDER THE FRCP?
Since social media does not fit neatly into a traditional category of elec-
tronically stored information (ESI) such as e-mails or blogs, some lawyers
have pointed out the difficulty in determining just how social media
should be treated in the discovery process. 22 In some respects, social me-
dia shares many common attributes with e-mail since the sites often allow
users to send private messages to one another.23 Others argue that these
14. Id. at 1160.
15. Id. at 1161.
16. Id. at 1161-62.
17. BROWNING, supra note 4, at 19.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. See Andrew C. Payne, Twitigation: Old Rules in a New World, 49 WASHBURN L.J.
841, 864 (2010).
21. Privacy Policy, supra note 1.
22. See Bennett, supra note 2, at 415.
23. Id.
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sites operate much less like e-mails and much more like blogs or bulletin
boards due to the public nature of the sites and because many messages
posted are meant for multiple participants to see, "reach[ing] out to a
wider array of participants than they might contact through e-mail
alone."'24 But as at least one commentator has pointed out, the technical
classification of SNS may not matter when it comes to discovery of the
information under the FRCP.25
As early as 1970, the Advisory Committee for the FRCP recognized
the need to revise the discovery rules in such a way that would keep up
with ever-changing technological developments.2 6 As such, in 1970, Rule
34 was amended to include "data compilations" as an additional type of
potentially discoverable information. 27 For some time, many people, in-
cluding judges, assumed that the 1970 Rules would apply to electronic
discovery (e-discovery) as well as physical documents.28 The drafters of
the 2006 amendments, however, disagreed and therefore sought to create
new rules that would better reflect the differences between physical dis-
covery and e-discovery.29
In 2006, the FRCP were amended to reflect these changes, and Rule 34
was rewritten to allow a party to request any relevant "electronically
stored information.., stored in any medium from which information can
be obtained. ' 30 The Advisory Committee notes from the 2006 amend-
ments further clarified that ESI was meant to be "broad enough to cover
all current types of computer-based information, and flexible enough to
encompass future changes and developments."'3 1
Due to the amendments' broad language as well as the Advisory Com-
mittee notes, which clearly conveyed the committee's intentions that the
rules be flexible enough to cover and adapt to new and emerging technol-
ogies, there has been widespread agreement in the courts that social
networking information should be treated as ESI under the FRCP.32 As
one judge recently explained in EEOC v. Simply Storage Management,
LLC, discovery of social media simply "requires the application of basic
discovery principles in a novel context. ' 33 Accordingly, any social
networking information should qualify as ESI as long as it fits Rule 34's
broad definition requiring that the data compilations be stored.34
24. Id.
25. Id. at 416.
26. Evan E. North, Facebook Isn't Your Space Anymore: Discovery of Social Network-
ing Websites, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1279, 1281 (2010).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1283.
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (Advisory Committee's note to the 2006 amendment).
32. Michael Goodfried & Martha Dawson, Discovery of Social Networking Sites, 5 E-
DISCOVERY CONNECTnON, no. 3, 2010, available at http://clients.criticalimpact.com/newslet-
ter/newslettercontentshowl.cfm?contentid=3175&id=474.
33. EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 434 (S.D. Ind. 2010); see
also Goodfried & Dawson, supra note 32.
34. Goodfried & Dawson, supra note 32.
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While case law in this area is still rapidly developing, most courts have
reached the conclusion that relevant information posted on SNS is dis-
coverable. 35 Interestingly, at least one scholar has fervently disagreed,
pointing to the inherent differences between social networking informa-
tion and traditional forms of ESI as reason that courts should not simply
apply the same cookie-cutter rules to SNS, an entirely different form of
technology.36 Rather, the analysis should be adapted to take into account
the nuances of social networking information. 37 Courts, however, have
yet to demonstrate any intention to adopt such an approach.
D. THE SCOPE OF SNS DISCOVERY: RULE 26 AND THE ROLE OF
PROTECTIVE ORDERS
Once courts establish that social networking information is a type of
ESI, courts must then turn to Rule 26 to evaluate the scope of discovera-
ble information in a given case. According to Rule 26, "[p]arties may
obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
any party's claim or defense. ' 38 "Relevant information need not be ad-
missible at... trial," but rather only needs to "appear[ ] reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. '39
The scope of discovery was changed significantly by the adoption of the
FRCP in 1938.40 Prior to the adoption, discovery was limited to informa-
tion that could also be admissible in trial.41 The adoption of the Federal
Rules greatly increased the scope of discoverable information by merely
requiring that the discoverable information be helpful in preparation for
trial.42 The purpose behind the widened scope of the new discovery rules
was to "ease preparation for trial, to avoid surprise at trial, and to en-
courage the resolution of cases on their merits."'43
With the increase in the scope of discoverable information, a greater
amount of confidential and private information became accessible. 44 The
drafters recognized that broad discovery could cause problems and,
therefore, designed protections through the advent of protection orders
under Rule 30(b), the predecessor of current Rule 26(C). 45 Under Rule
26(c), the court retains the power to "issue an order to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
35. Beth C. Boggs & Misty L. Edwards, Does What Happens on Facebook Stay on
Facebook? Discovery, Admissibility, Ethics, and Social Media, 98 ILL. B.J. 366, 367 (2010).
36. See Payne, supra note 20, at 842.
37. See id. at 864.
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
39. Id.
40. Sheila J. Baran, Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.: "Good Cause"
Wins the Battle, But Will Protective Orders Survive the Product Liability War?, 53 MERCER
L. REV. 1675, 1678-79 (2002).




45. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
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expense" by "forbidding the disclosure or discovery," by limiting the
scope of discovery, or by specifying the terms for disclosure of the discov-
ery, among other protective options within the court's discretion.4 6 Even
though "privacy" is not specifically mentioned in the rule, a protected
privacy interest is implied if the release of the private information would
result in embarrassment or oppression. 7 Although legitimate privacy in-
terests may provide the basis for a litigant to obtain a protective order
under Rule 26(c), the order may not provide as much protection as the
litigant would desire since, even if a protective order is granted, the order
rarely blocks discovery of the information and often merely limits the use
and distribution of the information gathered.4 8
E. EARLY CASES APPLYING THE FEDERAL RULES TO SNS
In 2007, U.S. courts first began addressing whether information con-
tained within SNS should be discoverable. 49 In one of the earliest and
most detailed cases involving the discovery of SNS information, Mackel-
prang v. Fidelity National Title Agency, the District of Nevada denied the
defendant's motion to compel the plaintiff to consent to the release of her
social profile information.50 Although the court ultimately denied the
motion to compel, the ruling should not be confused with the notion that
SNS information is never discoverable. 51 Instead, the judge explicitly left
open the possibility that some of the information could be discoverable in
some instances. 52 The appropriate way to obtain the information, the
judge explained, was to serve the plaintiff with a narrowly tailored re-
quest for production of relevant e-mail communications.5 3 Otherwise, the
judge explained, a litigant is merely engaging in a "fishing expedition"
when he has no relevant basis for discovering the messages in the
account.54
The opinion also set forth a noteworthy discussion regarding the proce-
dure surrounding relevancy determinations in the SNS context. Although
the court agreed with the defendant that interested parties "cannot be the
'final arbiter' of relevance," the judge pointed out each party's duty to
comply with discovery requests with a good-faith response, mandated by
46. Id.
47. Patrick S. Kim, Note, Third Party Modification of Protective Orders Under Rule
26(c), 94 MIcH. L. REV. 854, 865 (1995).
48. David K. Isom, Romano and Facebook: Muddling Toward the Law of Privacy on
Social Networks, INFO. LAW GRP. (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.infolawgroup.com/tags/
stored-communications-act/.
49. Mackelprang v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Agency of Nev., Inc., No. 2:06-CV-00788-JCM-
GWF, 2007 WL 119149, at *8-9 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007); T.V. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Educ.,
No. UNN-L-4479-04, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3005, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. June 8,
2007) (unpublished disposition).




54. Id. at *2.
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the Federal Rules and corresponding ethical obligations.55 Only when a
party can demonstrate that the adversary is wrongfully withholding rele-
vant information can the information-seeking party request relief.56 The
court also rejected the role of in camera review for relevancy determina-
tions, stating that this type of review is ordinarily only used to resolve
disputes involving privilege. 57 Therefore, the court denied any basis to
conduct an in camera review to determine whether the litigant's SNS con-
tained private messages that were either relevant or discoverable.
58
Just months after the Mackelprang opinion, a New Jersey Superior
Court also denied a motion to compel the release of information from a
SNS. 59 In TV. v. Union Township, the plaintiff, a minor, was sexually
assaulted at school, and the defendant's counsel sought production of the
plaintiff's MySpace page, arguing that the contents of the site might shed
light on the plaintiff's state of mind and therefore provide information
relevant to the plaintiff's emotional distress claims.60 The plaintiff's
counsel raised numerous privacy objections, and the judge granted a pro-
tective order denying production of the requested SNS content. 61 Al-
though, on its face, the opinion might seem to indicate that courts will bar
discovery based on privacy objections, the judge notably left open the
possibility for later discovery of the information if particularized rele-
vance could be shown.62
F. THE CANADIAN STYLE
Although it may seem unusual to address the Canadian courts' treat-
ment of SNS discovery issues, a few key Canadian opinions are worth
mentioning since they heavily influenced many opinions in the United
States courts. Due to the limited precedent available regarding discovery
of SNS information in United States courts, many courts have turned to
Canadian precedent in order to analyze these issues.63 Canadian courts
first addressed SNS privacy concerns in Murphy v. Perger.64 In Murphy,
the judge held that any privacy concerns regarding the production of in-
formation from a private Facebook profile were minimal and totally out-
weighed by the defendant's need for the information, and therefore the
court ordered production. 65 Later, in Leduc v. Roman, a Canadian ap-




59. T.V. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. UNN-L-4479-04, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub.
LEXIS 3005, at *1, (N.J. Super. Ct. June 8, 2007) (unpublished disposition).
60. Discovery of Assault Victim's MySpace, Facebook Postings Denied, 3-12 Mealey's
Privacy Rep. 6 (2007).
61. ld.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 434, 437 (S.D. Ind.
2010); Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 654 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
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pellate judge relied on some of Murphy's analysis in a case also involving
discovery of SNS.66 Disagreeing with the lower court's holding, the ap-
pellate judge ruled that from the existence of the social networking page,
it was "reasonable to infer that [the plaintiff's] ... social networking site
likely contains some content relevant to the issue of how [the plaintiff]...
has been able to lead his life since the accident. '67 The court agreed that
the rules require at least some evidence "that a party possesses a relevant
document before a court can order production. '68 The court made clear,
however, that it has the power to infer, from the nature of the SNS ser-
vice, "the likely existence of relevant documents on a limited-access
Facebook profile," and held that the lower court erred by denying the
defendant the opportunity to question the plaintiff through an affidavit to
see what relevant information might have been available on the site.69
In contrast, a recent decision in another Ontario court appeared to
reach a different conclusion. In Schuster v. Royal & Sun Alliance Insur-
ance Company, the defendant gained knowledge of the plaintiff's limited
access Facebook profile and sought production of its contents. 70 The
court, however, denied production without the defendant demonstrating
that the site contained relevant evidence, thereby rejecting the automatic
presumption of relevance set forth earlier in Leduc.71
Although it is still unclear whether courts in Canada will automatically
assume that a limited-access Facebook profile contains relevant content,
it is clear that Canadian courts allow all SNS to be potentially discovera-
ble and that the courts have given little weight to the privacy concerns
raised by litigants in barring discovery.72
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
In the past few months alone, U.S. courts have demonstrated added
confusion regarding the discoverability of social media information, issu-
ing inconsistent holdings with slightly different analyses and results. 73
66. Leduc v. Roman, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, para. 36 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL).
67. Id. at para. 32.
68. Id. at para. 33.
69. Id. at para. 36.
70. Schuster v. Royal & Sun Alliance Ins. Co. of Can., 2009 CarswellOnt 6586, para.
26 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL).
71. Id. at para. 39.
72. See id. at paras. 39-40; Leduc v. Roman, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, para. 33 (Can.
Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL); Murphy v. Perger, 2007 CarswellOnt 9439, paras. 19-20 (Can. Ont.
Sup. Ct. J.) (WL).
73. See, e.g., Barnes v. CUS Nashville, LLC, No. 3:09-cv-00764, 2010 WL 2265668, at
*1 (M.D. Tenn. June 3, 2010) (noting that the judge would add plaintiff as a "friend" on
Facebook for the sole purpose of reviewing photographs and related comments in camera);
Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 990-91 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (blocking
discovery of certain SNS information due to implications from the Stored Communications
Act); EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 435-36 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (or-
dering the production of relevant SNS communications); Mackelprang v. Fidelity Nat'l Ti-
tle Agency of Nev., Inc., No. 2:06-cv-00788-JCM-GWF, 2007 WL 119149, at *8-9 (D. Nev.
Jan. 9, 2007) (denying defendant's Motion to Compel but noting the "proper method for
obtaining such information, however, is to serve upon Plaintiff properly limited requests
2011] 1441
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Recently, rather than merely turning to the precedents set forth in early
opinions such as Mackelprang and Leduc for guidance, courts have issued
numerous different analyses regarding when and what social media infor-
mation should be discoverable.74 These holdings range from requiring
the litigant to turn over all social networking information including logins
and passwords, 75 to enlisting the judge in the case to "friend" the litigant
to obtain access to information and perform an in camera review, 76 and to
allowing discovery of any information that fulfills narrowly tailored dis-
covery requests.77 When litigants seek information from the third-party
social networking sites directly, rather than from the actual SNS user,
courts have employed additional analyses, confusing the field even
more.78 This Comment discusses each of these approaches in turn, and
after performing a thorough examination of the law, highlights some of
the biggest problems with the current methods and suggests a sustainable
approach courts should use in the future.
A. SOCIAL NETWORKING LOGINS AND PASSWORDS
Requiring litigants to turn over total access to their accounts, including
user names and passwords, is one of the most aggressive discovery paths a
court can mandate when it comes to discovery of SNS information. Re-
cently, however, at least two courts did just that.79 In McMillen v. Hum-
mingbird, the judge ordered the plaintiff to turn over the account names
and passwords for his SNS profiles to the opposing party. 80 The plaintiff
contested by arguing that the communications were shared among private
friends on a social networking site, and therefore, the communications
were confidential and should be protected from disclosure.81 The judge,
however, rejected the existence of any "social networking site privilege" 82
and clarified that new privileges should not be recognized unless four ele-
ments could be established: (1) the communication originated in confi-
dence, (2) the confidentiality of the communication is essential to
maintain the relationship between the parties, (3) there is agreement in
for production of relevant email communications"); Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907
N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (granting "access to Plaintiff's current and historical
Facebook and MySpace pages and accounts, including all deleted pages and related infor-
mation"); McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 Pa. Dist. &
Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 270, at *13 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Sept. 9, 2010) (ordering plaintiff to "pro-
vide his Facebook and MySpace user names and passwords to counsel").
74. See, e.g., Barnes, 2010 WL 2265668, at *1; Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 990-91;
Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at *8; EEOC, 270 F.R.D. at 435-36; Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d
at 657; McMillen, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 270, at *13.
75. See Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 657; McMillen, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS
270, at *13.
76. See Barnes, 2010 WL 2265668, at *1.
77. See EEOC, 270 F.R.D. at 435-36.
78. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 990-91.
79. See Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 657; McMillen, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS
270, at *13.
80. McMillen, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 270, at *13.
81. Id. at *3.
82. Id.
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the general community that the particular relationship needs to be fos-
tered, and (4) the potential injury sustained due to disclosure outweighs
the benefit of disclosing the particular information in litigation.83 The
judge cited Facebook's privacy policy as evidence that any communica-
tions made via a SNS failed to meet the first requirement since users are
put on notice that, regardless of subjective intention, communications can
be disseminated by friends or even by the SNS itself.84 So since, at a bare
minimum, the SNS providers had access to the information, the confiden-
tiality element of a potential privilege cannot exist, and the law will not
protect against the sharing of these communications. 85
After concluding that no privilege exists, the judge held that SNS infor-
mation should be discoverable whenever there is an indication that a per-
son's SNS contains information relevant to the prosecution or defense of
a lawsuit.86 Puzzlingly though, the judge then ordered that the plaintiff
grant the opposing party total access to the sites including login names
and passwords. 87 As rationale for his decision, the judge cited only to
precedent requiring that courts use "all rational means for ascertaining
the truth" and the law's general disfavorment of privileges. 88
Under a similar fact situation, a New York court also ordered access to
all information contained on a social networking profile by granting the
information-seeking defendants "access" to the plaintiff's current and his-
torical Facebook and MySpace pages and accounts, including all deleted
pages and related information. 89 The court held that because the public
profile page of the Facebook contained a picture of the plaintiff "smiling
happily in a photograph outside the confines of her home despite her
claim that she has sustained permanent injuries and is largely confined to
her house and bed," the profile picture was enough to present "a reasona-
ble likelihood" that the private portions of her site would shed informa-
tion about her lifestyle to discredit her loss of enjoyment of life claim.90
The court concluded that to deny discovery of the websites would inter-
fere with New York's liberal discovery policies and "condone Plaintiff's
attempt to hide relevant information behind self-regulated privacy set-
tings."91 Much like McMillen, the court seemingly ignored the fact that
much of the information contained within the SNS profile may not have
been relevant to the case at hand. Rather than requiring the defendant to
narrow the requests to specific items relevant to the case, the court inex-
plicably granted access to the entire social networking profile, regardless
of the type of content inside. 92 In response to the plaintiff's privacy ob-
83. Id. at *5.
84. Id. at *6-9.
85. Id. at *9-10.
86. Id. at *12.
87. Id. at *13.
88. Id. at *12.
89. Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
90. Id. at 654.
91. Id. at 655.
92. Id. at 657.
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jections, the court flatly rejected the notion that people have any reasona-
ble expectation of privacy concerning the information on their social
networking pages, basing its holding on a Second Circuit opinion holding
that individuals may not enjoy an expectation of privacy for Internet
postings or e-mails. 93 The court also cited Facebook and MySpace's pri-
vacy policies as further proof that users should not have any reasonable
expectation of privacy since the policies make users aware the informa-
tion may become publicly available.94 Consequently, despite the user's
control over privacy settings, the court characterized any claims to pri-
vacy as "no longer grounded in reasonable expectations but, rather, in
some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking." 95
B. IN CAMERA REVIEW
Rather than requiring access to the entire social networking site, some
courts have taken a somewhat less intrusive approach by allowing the
judge to determine which information is relevant to the issues at hand
and therefore producible. 96 The "in camera review" approach differs
from the former since it requires the judge to assess the information on
the social networking profile to determine if any of the information
should be discoverable, and if so, what information on the site must be
produced.97 In a recent federal district court case in Connecticut, Bass v.
Miss Porter's School, in response to the plaintiff's objection to production
of her SNS content, the court issued an order requiring the plaintiff to
produce all documents that were responsive to the defendants' specified
discovery requests and also required production of the plaintiff's entire
profile of information to the court for in camera review.98 After perform-
ing the in camera review, the judge found that the set of documents pro-
duced for review contained many more relevant documents that should
have been produced than the plaintiff turned over to the defendant.99
The court held that the relevancy of the plaintiff's Facebook usage was
more "in the eye of the beholder than subject to strict legal demarcations,
and production should not be limited to Plaintiff's own determination of
what may be 'reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence."'100 Unlike the judges in McMillen and Romano, the judge de-
voted attention to the relevancy requirement before automatically requir-
ing all information on the site to be produced, but the judge had a
broader opinion of what met the relevancy requirement than the produc-
93. Id. at 656.
94. Id. at 656-57.
95. Id. at 657.
96. See Barnes v. CUS Nashville, LLC, No. 3:09-CV-00764, 2010 WL 2265668, at *1
(M.D. Tenn. June 3, 2010); Bass v. Miss Porter's Sch., No. 3:08-CV-1807, 2009 WL 3724968,
at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 2009).
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ing party.101
Another federal court in Tennessee chose to take a similar approach,
with a fairly unique twist.'0 2 In Barnes v. CUS Nashville, LLC, the judge
innovatively offered to "friend" the plaintiff in order to see the more pri-
vate aspects of the litigant's Facebook profile to perform an in camera
review of the information contained within the site.10 3 After the review,
the judge agreed to disseminate the relevant information to the parties
and then close the Facebook account he created.1°4 The Barnes approach
placed the relevancy determination in the judge's hands from the onset,
and although it appears to be an efficient way to quickly gain access to
questionable content, the method does not come without its own inherent
problems. Due to the structure of Facebook, a "friend" will not immedi-
ately gain access to all of the user's SNS content. For example, private
messages sent between the user and other friends, besides the judge,
would not be visible for the judge to examine. 10 5 In addition, the judge
would not have ready access to deleted content or any information
blocked through one of the many privacy settings available to the user.'0 6
C. SNS DISCOVERABLE As LONG As REQUESTED IN NARROWLY
TAILORED DISCOVERY REQUESTS
Rather than requiring a judge to perform an in camera review of SNS
content or requiring the litigant to automatically produce all information
from his SNS profile, at least one court has advocated an approach like
that set forth earlier in Mackelprang, requiring that SNS content be pro-
duced, but only to the extent it was relevant to the case and requested
within narrowly tailored discovery requests. 07 In EEOC v. Simply Stor-
age, the court agreed that information found on social networking
profiles should be discoverable, but limited discovery requests for SNS
content only to information that could be relevant to the case.' 0 8 The
court acknowledged the broad and permissive nature of Rule 26, but at
the same time, the court noted that Rule 26 "is not without its limits."' 0 9
Consequently, the court held that the discovery requests should be per-
mitted for SNS content, but the information-seeking party needed to pre-
cisely narrow its requests to reflect the relevant legal issues in the case
101. Id.
102. Barnes v. CUS Nashville, LLC, No. 3:09-CV-00764, 2010 WL 2265668, at *1 (M.D.
Tenn. June 3, 2010).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Privacy for Messages, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=940 (last
visited Aug. 10, 2011) (explaining that messages sent between users are "absolutely pri-
vate" and "[o]nly you and the person you're messaging can view the contents and history
of your conversation").
106. Privacy: Privacy Settings and Fundamentals, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/
help/?page=839 (last visited Aug. 10, 2011).
107. See EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 435-36 (S.D. Ind.
2010).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 433.
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before the plaintiff would be required to turn over necessary
information.110
D. THIRD-PARTY SUBPOENA
The three approaches mentioned above included requiring the release
of social networking logins and passwords, imposing an in camera review,
and mandating the release of relevant information subject to specified
discovery requests. The approaches differ significantly from each other,
reflecting the confusion in the courts regarding discovery of SNS content.
When a third-party subpoena becomes involved, however, the analysis
differs even more markedly and presents even more unanswered ques-
tions of law. Some lawyers prefer to first subpoena the third-party SNS
provider, such as Facebook or MySpace, directly in order to avoid objec-
tions from the producing party and ensure they receive all relevant con-
tent, including, at times, deleted content.'11 The court's analysis in cases
involving third-party subpoenas differs greatly from its analysis in those
cases where the information is requested directly from the litigant due to
possible implications of the Stored Communications Act (SCA), which
arise when a third party becomes involved. 112 Basically, the SCA pre-
vents persons or entities providing electronic communication services to
the public from "knowingly divulg[ing] to any person or entity the con-
tents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service."'113
Although there is some disagreement as to whether the SCA should even
apply in the social media context due to the outmoded language con-
tained within the more than twenty-year-old act,114 at least some courts
have interpreted the act to apply in the social media context and, there-
fore, block discovery from third parties of certain social media
information." 5
In a recent federal district court case in California, Crispin v. Christian
Audigier, Judge Morrow issued a detailed opinion discussing why social
networks were subject to the restrictions of the SCA.116 The judge ex-
plained that the SCA applies to both remote computing service (RCS)
providers and electronic communication service (ECS) providers and lim-
its the ability of ECS providers and RCS providers to disclose private
information. 117 The first step, then, was for the court to decide whether
110. Id. at 437.
111. See Daniel E. Cummins, Pa. Court Opens Door to Discovery of Social Networks,
L. TECH. NEWS, Oct. 27, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.
jsp?id=1202473973113&PaCourtOpens Door toDiscovery-ofLSocialNetworks.
112. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 990-91 (C.D. Cal.
2010).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2006).
114. Alan Klein, John M. Lyons, & Andrew R. Sperl, Social Networking Sites: Subject to
Discovery?, NAT't L.J. (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/nljfPubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=
1202470819522&Socialnetworking-sitesSubject to-discovery&slreturn=l&hbxlogin=1.
115. See Barnes v. CUS Nashville, LLC, No. 3:09-0764, 2010 WL 2196591, at *1 (M.D.
Tenn. May 27, 2010); Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 990-91.
116. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 976-91.
117. Id. at 971-72.
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social media sites should be classified as an ECS or RCS provider.
According to the SCA, an ECS provider is technically defined as "any
service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire
or electronic communications," '1 8 and an RCS is defined as "the provi-
sion to the public of computer storage or processing services by means of
an electronic communications system."" 9 Under the SCA's definition,
an ECS provider is prohibited from disclosing "the contents of a commu-
nication while in electronic storage by that service."'1 20 On the contrary,
RCS providers are prohibited from disclosing any communication re-
ceived by electronic submission that is kept on the service "solely for the
purpose of providing storage or computer processing services to [the]
subscriber or customer."121
The court was left to examine whether private messages or wall posts
were covered by the SCA and engaged in a separate analysis for each
type of communication. With regard to private messages, the court even-
tually concluded that due to the nature of the private messaging function,
social media providers should be classified as both an ECS provider and a
RCS provider, which meant that these types of communications were
subject to the limitations of the SCA.122 The court held that the SNS
entity was operating as an ECS provider with regards to sent but un-
opened messages since the messages seem to fall within the ECS defini-
tion of "temporary, intermediate storage."' 23 Conversely, once the
messages were opened and retained, the court explained that the SNS
operators were providing storage services, and therefore, the SNS provid-
ers fit under the RCS classification. 124
With regard to Facebook wall posts and MySpace comments, the court
struggled much more to classify the communications. The court recog-
nized the difficulty in interpreting and applying statutory language, writ-
ten prior to the creation of the World Wide Web, to today's most modern
technologies. 125 Relying heavily on the legislative history of the SCA, the
court held that the SCA does apply to wall postings and comments.1 26 In
reaching its conclusion, the court gave weight to Congress's primary in-
tentions behind enacting the SCA: to protect private electronic communi-
cations including private electronic bulletin boards.127 Therefore, the
court concluded that the subpoenas related to obtaining Facebook wall
posts and MySpace comments would only be quashed if the party seeking
to quash the subpoena could demonstrate that the privacy settings were
118. Id. at 972 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006)).
119. Id. at 973 (quoting § 2711(2)).
120. Id. at 972 (quoting § 2702(a)(1)).
121. Id. at 973 (quoting § 2702(a)(2)).
122. Id. at 987.
123. Id. (quoting § 2510(17)(A)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 988.




restricted by the user so as to make the postings private, 128 since the SCA
does not protect against "electronic communication[s] [that are] readily
accessible to the general public. ' 129 Leaving open the question of how
many users the information must be shared with before the information
would not be protected by the SCA, the court impliedly indicated that if
access was limited to a "few," then this particular information would be
considered "private" and therefore protected by the SCA. 130
Similarly, but with much less explanation, in Barnes v. CUS Nashville,
LLC, a federal court in the Middle District of Tennessee used the SCA to
quash a third-party subpoena in the social media context.131 The court,
with little other explanation, affirmed that the SCA blocks the disclosure
of the information sought from Facebook by subpoena.132
In stark contrast to both Crispin and Barnes, in Ledbetter, a federal
case in the District of Colorado decided about one year prior to Crispin
and Barnes, the court did not quash the subpoenas sent directly to the
third-party social networking sites.1 33 Although the plaintiff in the case
sought a protective order under the marital and physician-patient privi-
leges to protect the information, the court held that these privileges were
waived by bringing suit, and the court refused to grant a protective or-
der. 134 The court held that the information was discoverable since it was
"reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,"
but the opinion mysteriously contained no discussion of the SCA as a
potential block to the subpoenas issued to the social networking site
providers. 135
IV. ANALYSIS
From the discussion of the current state of the law, it is clear that courts
are confused as how best to treat information that comes from SNS.
From misanalyzing relevancy issues to misunderstanding the role of pri-
vacy, courts have taken many analytical missteps along the way. Al-
though some commentators argue that with the advent of SNS comes the
need for the application of totally new discovery rules,1 36 this Comment
argues that ideal results can best be obtained by simply following the
traditional FRCP. Given the current state of the law, courts should en-
gage in a more consistent analysis, focusing on key factors including
whether the information is accessible to the general public or restricted
128. Id. at 991.
129. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (2006)).
130. Id. at 988.
131. Id. at 990-91; Barnes v. CUS Nashville, LLC, No. 3:09-0764, 2010 WL 2196591, at
*1 (M.D. Tenn. May 27, 2010).
132. Barnes, 2010 WL 2196591, at *1.
133. Ledbetter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-CV-01958-WYD-MJW, 2009 WL
1067018, at *2 (D. Colo. April 21, 2009).
134. Id. at *1.
135. Id. at *2.
136. Payne, supra note 20, at 842.
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by privacy settings, the relevancy of the SNS content in a given case, and
finally, the source of who will be providing the information.
A. PUBLIC INFORMATION
The first step in outlining a workable guide for courts to use in deter-
mining whether SNS information should be discoverable is to determine
whether the information is accessible to the public or restricted by pri-
vacy settings. A profile that contains public information provides the eas-
iest analysis for the courts. Because the information is readily available
to the public eye, any party can access this information without going
through the discovery process at all.137 This avoids any potential objec-
tions from the producing party.
However, the question of whether information is technically "publicly
accessible" can raise issues of its own. For example, on Facebook, a regis-
tered user may choose to restrict access to the public at large but still
allow access to content on the site to the user's "friends."'1 38 In other
words, the information is not visible to the general public, but it is still
readily visible content to anyone who is "friends" with the user. Since a
lawyer could easily gain access to some private information by either
"friending" the user or having an unknown third party "friend" the user,
this issue raises important ethical considerations.
Some savvy lawyers have already realized this possibility, and as a re-
sult, at least one bar association has issued an ethics opinion addressing
this type of behavior.139 The Philadelphia Bar Association issued a re-
cent ethics opinion prohibiting attorneys from gaining access to an adver-
sary's SNS profile by asking third parties to "friend" the adverse party or
witness in order to gain access to information restricted only to the user's
"friends.' 140 The Bar Association held that the action would violate Rule
8.4(c) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, a rule that bars
"deceptive" actions.14' As long as the attorney does not hide his identity,
the ethics opinion recognized that the attorney can attempt to "friend"
the witness since this conduct does not involve "dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation."' 42
B. PRIVATE INFORMATION
When the information is not publically accessible, courts should ap-
proach the question of discoverability in an entirely different manner.
137. Russell T. Burke, Social Networking Discovery: Get Used to It, DRI, Aug. 10, 2011,
available at http://clients.criticalimpact.com/newsletter/newslettercontentshowl.cfm?con-
tentid=1865&id=316.
138. See Privacy: Privacy Settings and Fundamentals, supra note 106.
139. Phila. Bar Ass'n Prof'l Guidance Comm. Op. 2009-02 (2009), available at http://
www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServer
Resources/CMSResources/Opinion_2009-2.pdf.
140. Id. at 1.
141. Id. at 2-3.
142. Id. at 2.
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The first factor courts will need to consider is whether the information is
sought from the SNS third-party provider or the actual user of the SNS.
Because of the potential interaction of the SCA in cases where a third-
party provider is involved, the analysis will differ distinctly in these
cases.
143
1. Third-Party SNS Provider
When a third-party SNS provider is subpoenaed directly for informa-
tion, the court will need to consider the implications of the SCA.144 As
Crispin and Barnes pointed out, it is likely that the SCA might apply in
these cases to block information if the courts find the information was
meant to be private.145 However, since the Crispin and Barnes opinions
were only district court decisions, the decision to apply the SCA to SNS
information is not binding on courts of other jurisdictions. 146 Nonethe-
less, it is likely that other courts may turn to these opinions for
guidance.147
Once a court makes the decision that the SCA should apply in a given
case, the SCA still may not necessarily result in a bar to discovery. Since
the SCA only bars discovery of "private" information, courts will then be
tasked with deciding whether the information sought is private.148 In the
social media context, the question of whether certain content deserves a
privacy expectation results in a complex analysis since personal privacy
settings are so versatile and will likely change based on the privacy set-
tings of the particular communications at issue. For example, if the com-
munication was sent using the SNS's private message function, a court
will likely protect discovery of the communication from a third party
under the SCA, much like the court's holdings in Crispin and Barnes.149
The toughest privacy analysis occurs when the information sought is
shared with a limited number of people, such as the SNS user's group of
"friends." It is unclear how many people the communication would need
to be shared with before a court would fail to recognize a privacy expec-
tation for SCA purposes. For example, if the communication was shared
with all of the user's "friends," but the user only had three "friends" on
Facebook, a court may still consider the user to have at least some expec-
tation of privacy for the information shared and therefore quash the sub-
143. See, e.g., Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 975 (C.D. Cal.
2010).
144. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 974; Barnes v. CUS Nashville, LLC, No. 3:09-0764,
2010 WL 2196591, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. May 27, 2010).
145. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 990-91; Barnes, 2010 WL 2196591, at *1.
146. The Stored Communications Act: District Court Issues First Opinion on Privacy
Protection for Information on Social Networking and Web Hosting Sites, MORGAN LEWIS
(June 14, 2010), http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/eDataStoredCommAct-LF_14junlO.
pdf.
147. Id.
148. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (2008).
149. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2010);
Barnes v. CUS Nashville, LLC, No. 3:09-0764, 2010 WL 2196591, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. May
27, 2010).
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poena on SCA grounds. 150 On the other hand, if the same information
was shared with a user's "friends," but the user happened to have two
thousand friends, it seems that courts will be and should be much less
likely to protect the communication based on any privacy grounds.151
Since this issue has not been thoroughly addressed by the courts,152 it is
unclear how the courts may rule in the future. In making future determi-
nations, this Comment recommends that courts perform a balancing test,
weighing a variety of factors to determine whether the given communica-
tion is private and subject to the protections of the SCA. Factors that
courts may want to consider in their analysis include the number of peo-
ple or "friends" that had access to the communication, the substance of
the content (how embarrassing the content might be if released), the type
of people that had access to the communication, and the inherent public
nature of SNS.
The last factor, however, the public nature of SNS, would seem to be
enough for at least some courts to render the SCA toothless in all cases.
Although the court in Crispin asserted that at least some communications
made on SNS could qualify as private communications, some courts have
issued analyses implying that no matter the privacy setting, no informa-
tion ever posted on a SNS should deserve an expectation of privacy. 153
As reasoned by some courts, such as Romano, since most popular SNS do
not guarantee privacy, people cannot have any reasonable expectation of
privacy.1 54 In fact, the Facebook privacy policy specifically warns users
that despite privacy options, "no security measures are perfect or impene-
trable" and that any information shared through the site risks becoming
"publicly available. 1 55 It seems unlikely that courts following Romano's
line of reasoning would ever find a SNS communication private and pro-
tected from discovery by the SCA.156
As such, there is an enormous amount of gray area in this area of the
law. Fortunately for litigants seeking discovery, much of this uncertainty
can be easily avoided with proper planning. First of all, customer consent
150. See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991 (an expectation of privacy was an implied possi-
bility since the court remanded the decision of whether certain wall posts were discovera-
ble based on inadequate facts regarding the privacy settings of those posts).
151. See id.
152. Id. ("Given that the only information in the record implied restricted access, the
court concludes that Judge McDermott's order regarding this aspect of the Facebook and
MySpace subpoenas was contrary to law. Because it appears, however, that a review of
plaintiff's privacy settings would definitively settle the question, the court does not reverse
Judge McDermott's order, but vacates it and remands so that Judge McDermott can direct
the parties to develop a fuller evidentiary record regarding plaintiff's privacy settings.").
153. See Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 656-57 (Sup. Ct. 2010); McMillen
v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS
270, at *5-6 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Sept. 9, 2010).
154. See Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
155. Privacy Policy, supra note 1.
156. See Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 657 (explaining "when Plaintiff created her
Facebook and MySpace accounts, she consented to the fact that her personal information
would be shared with others, notwithstanding her privacy settings. Indeed, that is the very
nature and purpose of these social networking sites else they would cease to exist.").
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constitutes one major exception to the SCA.157 The party seeking infor-
mation should try to obtain consent from the SNS user. If consent is
obtained, the SCA would no longer potentially void a subpoena to a third
party, and the third-party provider would be required to comply with the
subpoena request.158
Obviously, in many cases, the user may not want to readily give the
consent necessary to allow the opposing party to acquire his SNS infor-
mation. If the user fails to consent, the information seeker can turn to
the court and move for a motion to compel. 159 As long as the informa-
tion-seeking litigant can demonstrate that the third-party provider main-
tains information relevant to the case, the court will likely grant the
motion and compel the reluctant litigant to consent.160 In Flagg v. City of
Detroit, the court held that the producing party must give the requisite
consent required under the SCA so that the information-seeking party
could gain access to the information without interference by the SCA.161
Even when the information is sought from a non-party to the suit, the
non-party may still be required to give consent to third parties when is-
sued a subpoena under Rule 45.162 In Thomas v. Deloitte Consulting, the
court held that subpoenas, under Rule 45, include any documents that the
non-party can obtain, and therefore, the court required the non-party in
the case to grant access to their bank to release records. 163 Therefore,
consent, in many cases, can effectively eliminate the possible hurdles
presented by the SCA, which may render any detailed analysis regarding
the convoluted state of the law surrounding the SCA and its interactions
with social media simply an unnecessary headache. 164
2. Obtaining Discovery Directly from SNS User
If the information is not available to the general public, however, and
the information-seeking litigant does not try to subpoena the third-party
SNS, the litigant can also try to obtain the information from the SNS user
directly. Just like a discovery request in any other context, the procedure
for obtaining the SNS from a user directly includes sending a request for
157. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(c) (2008).
158. FED. R. Civ. P. 45.
159. BROWNING, supra note 4, at 126.
160. Bennett, supra note 2, at 422-23 ("[Cjourts have suggested that, at very least, a
litigant in a dispute may be required to provide consent for access to social networking
sites that contain information relevant to a dispute before the court. That is, if the litigant
has the ability to obtain 'control' over such information by providing consent to the ISP,
then the litigant must provide such consent as part of its discovery obligations.").
161. Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 363 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
162. Timothy G. Ackermann, Consent and Discovery Under the Stored Communica-
tions Act, 56 FED. LAW. 42 (2009), available at http://www.pattersonsheridan.com/images/
uploads/SCAControlarticlePUBLISHED-crop.pdf.
163. Thomas v. Deloitte Consulting LLP, No. 3-02-CV-0343-M, 2004 WL 1372954, at *4
(N.D. Tex. June 14, 2004); see also Ackermann, supra note 162, at 45.
164. See BROWNING, supra note 4, at 125-26.
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production of all relevant documents to the opposing litigant.1 65 By send-
ing a discovery request directly to the profile user, the information-seek-
ing litigant will avoid the potential hurdles presented by the SCA, and
therefore, this option may be the most strategic one for litigants. 166 In
recent years, however, courts have demonstrated difficulty in deciding
how to proceed when information is requested directly, namely due to
confusion about the role of relevance and privacy in discovery of SNS.1 67
a. Discoverability: A Question of Privacy or Relevance?
One area within which courts have become increasingly confused in-
volves the difference between privacy expectations and relevance, and
the role that each factor should play in determining whether particular
SNS content should be discoverable. 168 On the whole, many courts have
concluded that due to the inherently public nature of SNS, as well as the
sites' stated privacy policies, there should be no expectation of privacy,
and therefore, discovery should be allowed to proceed.169 Although
many courts end up reaching the correct holding, at least some courts
have portrayed fault in their reasoning. The question of discoverability
should rest mostly upon relevancy, not privacy.170 As the court in EEOC
v. Simply Storage so poignantly pointed out:
165. Mackelprang v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Agency of Nev., Inc., No. 2:06-CV-00788-JCM-
GWF, 2007 WL 119149, at *8 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007).
166. See, e.g., Bass v. Miss Porter's Sch., No. 3:08-CV-1807, 2009 WL 3724968, at *1 (D.
Conn. Oct. 27, 2009) (noting that plaintiff obtained information from SNS by first issuing
subpoena to the SNS directly and then passed on the relevant information to the
defendant).
167. See Barnes v. CUS Nashville, LLC, No. 3:09-CV-00764, 2010 WL 2265668, at *1
(M.D. Tenn. June 3, 2010) (noting that the judge would add plaintiff as a "friend" on
Facebook for the sole purpose of reviewing photographs and related comments in camera,
and he would promptly review and disseminate any relevant information to the parties);
EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 435-36 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (ordering
the production of relevant SNS communications); Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at *8-9
(denying defendant's Motion to Compel but noting the "proper method for obtaining such
information, however, is to serve upon Plaintiff properly limited requests for production of
relevant email communication); Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (Sup. Ct.
2010) (granting "access to Plaintiff's current and historical Facebook and MySpace pages
and accounts, including all deleted pages and related information"); McMillen v. Hum-
mingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 270, at *13
(Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Sept. 9, 2010) (ordering plaintiff to "provide his Facebook and MySpace
user names and passwords to counsel").
168. See, e.g., EEOC, 270 F.R.D. at 432 ("The EEOC objects to production of all SNS
content ... because they improperly infringe on claimants' privacy.").
169. See Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 657; McMillen, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS
270, at *5-6; Leduc v. Roman, 2009 CarswelOnt 843, paras. 30-35 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)
(WL).
170. Bennett, supra note 2, at 420 ("The Federal Rules, and equivalent state rules, do
not recognize any 'privacy' exception to the requirements of discovery (much less a 'social
networking privacy' exception)."); see also EEOC, 270 F.R.D. at 434 ("Although privacy
concerns may be germane to the question of whether requested discovery is burdensome
or oppressive and whether it has been sought for a proper purpose in the litigation, a
person's expectation and intent that her communications be maintained as private is not a
legitimate basis for shielding those communications from discovery.").
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Although privacy concerns may be germane to the question of
whether requested discovery is burdensome or oppressive and
whether it has been sought for a proper purpose in litigation, a per-
son's expectation and intent that her communication be maintained
as private is not a legitimate basis for shielding those communica-
tions from discovery. 171
At least some courts have seemed to confuse these two issues. 172
Often, at least some information in a SNS will be relevant to the case at
issue due to the broad and unrestrictive standards of Rule 26.173 The
scope of discovery under Rule 26 includes "any non-privileged matter
that is relevant to any party's claim or defense. ' 174 As long as discovery
requests are narrowly tailored so as to only include "relevant" informa-
tion of non-privileged matter, discovery should be permitted.
Privacy concerns, on the other hand, should play little role in compari-
son to relevancy when determining whether the SNS content in conten-
tion should be discoverable. As even the Supreme Court recognized,
The Rules do not differentiate between information that is private
or intimate and that to which no privacy interests attach. Under the
Rules, the only express limitations are that the information sought is
not privileged, and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending
action. Thus, the Rules often allow extensive intrusion into the af-
fairs of both litigants and third parties. 175
Mere privacy concerns, without more, do not create privilege, 176 and
therefore private information has, for decades, been discoverable. 177 In
Leon v. IDX Systems, for example, the court held that although certain
information may have been private, the information was still subject to
discovery and the private nature of the information was no defense to
destroying the information that should have otherwise been produced.178
Consequently, the litigant suffered spoliation charges after knowingly de-
171. EEOC, 270 F.R.D. at 434.
172. See, e.g., Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 657 ("Production of Plaintiff's entries on her
Facebook and MySpace accounts would not be violative of her right to privacy, and any
such concerns are outweighed by Defendant's need for the information.").
173. Baran, supra note 40, at 1678-79 ("Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938 ('Rules'), the discovery system limited the scope of information
that could be gathered to information admissible at trial. In 1938 the Rules expanded the
scope of discovery to any information that could conceivably help in the preparation of the
case.").
174. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (emphasis added).
175. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 30 (1984).
176. McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 Pa. Dist. &
Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 270, at *5 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Sept. 9, 2010) (noting that "[b]ecause evi-
dentiary privileges are ... [very] narrowly construed," courts often refuse "to extend the
scope of existing privileges beyond their historical" application such as the attorney-client,
clergy-penitent, psychologist-patient, and physician-patient contexts).
177. See, e.g., Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 220 F.R.D. 354, 359-61(D. Colo. 2004) (judge
required the production of certain diary entries noting that the defendant was entitled to
the discovery of "relevant, non-privileged matters"); Zises v. Dep't of Social Servs. of the
Human Res. Admin. of the City of N.Y., 112 F.R.D. 223, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (judge dis-
missed plaintiff's claim after plaintiff failed to produce diary entries).
178. Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2006).
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stroying the private information. 179
Since the determination of whether SNS content should be discovera-
ble depends first and foremost on relevancy of the content to a specific
dispute and not privacy concerns, at least some courts have misconstrued
the roles that relevancy and privacy should play.180 In cases such as Ro-
mano and McMillen, the courts held that since there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to the content posted on SNS, all con-
tent available on the sites should be turned over for production. 8 1 That
method, however, disregards the scope of discovery set forth in the
FRCP.182 According to Rule 26, the scope of discovery is limited to rele-
vant information, not any information, so long as the court finds there
was no reasonable expectation of privacy. 183
By requiring that total access to a person's account be turned over to
the opposing party, the court demonstrated profound neglect of the very
sensitive nature of much of the content stored on a user's SNS profile as
well as abandonment of the routine discovery procedures that have been
followed by attorneys for years. A typical discovery procedure requires
the information-seeking litigant to issue a production request so that the
producing party can gather the evidence, cull it for relevance and privi-
lege, and then produce the relevant non-privileged materials.1 84 As one
scholar has already realized, "[it would be a highly intrusive system if the
normal procedure was, instead of a party producing its own documents,
the other party's attorneys entering your house or business, looking
through all your papers and effects, and taking away the material that in
their judgment was relevant and non-privileged.' 85 Because of the broad
array of information stored on a SNS profile, to allow the opposing party
free access to SNS content would almost always result in the release of at
least some non-relevant and potentially very private information.
Some courts, on other hand, have correctly recognized the importance
of requiring production to be limited to relevant information. 86 These
courts require litigants to issue narrowly tailored discovery requests to
obtain access to the relevant portions of the SNS. 187 In Mackelprang, for
example, the judge explicitly recognized the problems inherent in forcing
the production of all SNS content by noting that "[o]rdering [p]laintiff to
179. Id.
180. See Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (Sup. Ct. 2010); McMillen,
2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 270, at *10-12.
181. See Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 657; McMillen, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS
270, at *11-13.
182. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
183. Id.
184. Bruce E. Boyden, Can You Be Forced to Turn Over Your Social Network Pass-




186. See Mackelprang v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Agency of Nev., Inc., No. 2:06-cv-00788-




execute the consent and authorization form for release of all of the pri-
vate ... messages ... would allow [d]efendants to cast too wide a net for
any information that might be relevant and discoverable. It would, of
course, permit Defendants to also obtain irrelevant information.
'188
Therefore, the court correctly recommended that the information-seeking
litigant rewrite any discovery request to seek only relevant
information. 189
Sometimes, however, it will be difficult for an attorney to prove there is
relevant content contained within a site if the entire site is made private.
To solve this problem, courts should follow the approach set forth in Le-
duc, allowing interrogatories or affidavits about the SNS content. 190 As
the court seemed to correctly recognize, the party otherwise has the abil-
ity to hide behind "self-set privacy controls," so an affidavit will allow
attorneys to determine whether there might be relevant information hid-
den behind the possible privacy settings barring public access.191 From
there, information-seeking litigants can use the knowledge gained to issue
particularized requests for certain relevant information from the sites, but
ultimately, the producing party should be the one to cull for relevancy
and turn over relevant information to the information seeker.
b. Best Method for Relevancy Determinations: In Camera or Self
Review?
Besides exhibiting confusion between the role of privacy and relevancy
in SNS discovery, courts have also demonstrated disagreement on the
most appropriate method for making relevancy determinations. 192 For
instance, some courts have required an in camera review of all SNS con-
tent to determine what SNS information is relevant and therefore poten-
tially discoverable while others simply leave the relevancy determination
to the producing party.193 Using in camera review to make relevancy de-
terminations should not be advocated for several reasons. First of all, in
camera review is extremely costly and time-consuming, creating addi-
tional strain on already limited judicial resources. 194 Although the infor-
mation-seeking party may have legitimate concerns that the producing
188. See id. at *7.
189. See id. at *8.
190. Leduc, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, para. 35 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL); see also
North, supra note 26, at 1300-01.
191. See Leduc, 2009 CarswellOnt 843 at para. 35.
192. See, e.g., Barnes v. CUS Nashville, LLC, No. 3:09-CV-00764, 2010 WL 2265668, at
*1 (M.D. Tenn. June 3, 2010) (noting that the judge would "friend" the information pro-
ducing party on Facebook to perform in camera review of relevant information); Mackel-
prang v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Agency of Nev., Inc., No. 2:06-cv-00788-JCH-GWF, 2007 WL
119149, at *8-9 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007) (rejecting in camera review as an appropriate
method to determine relevancy); Bass v. Miss Porter's Sch., No. 3:08-CV-1807, 2009 WL
3724968, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 2009) (performing an in camera review to determine
relevancy).
193. See, e.g., Barnes, 2010 WL 2265668, at *1; Bass, 2009 WL 3724968, at *1.
194. John Calvin Conway, Self-Evaluative Privilege and Corporate Compliance Audits,
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 639 (1995).
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party may have a biased sense of relevance, "counsel for the producing
party is the judge of relevance in the first interest."' 195 Indeed, in Bass,
after the performance of an in camera review, the judge admittedly found
a much broader set of documents that he deemed relevant than the pro-
ducing party had originally produced. 196 However, the producing party
must be trusted to give good-faith responses to any demands of produc-
tion since the complying attorney is bound by the Federal Rules as well as
professional and ethical obligations. 197 As Mackelprang pointed out, "in
camera review is ordinarily used when necessary to resolve disputes re-
garding privilege and is rarely used to determine relevance."'1 98 As more
and more information merges onto SNS platforms, SNS discovery will
continue to increase. 199 It will not be a sustainable practice for courts to
continue to require judges to review entire SNS for relevance in every
case, and therefore, these reviews must be reserved for cases where infor-
mation-seeking parties can demonstrate beyond a mere suspicion that the
producing party might be withholding relevant information.
c. The Role of Protective Orders
Since Rule 26 permits such liberal discovery, opposing parties often
have the ability to gain access to private and confidential information. 2°°
Protective orders are granted to limit the production of private and confi-
dential materials during discovery. 201 While Rule 26(c) does not explic-
itly mention privacy as an interest deserving a protective order, the Rule
does protect against the disclosure of information that would cause "an-
noyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense," 202
from which courts have implied a protected privacy interest.203 Many
courts have refused to recognize any expectation of privacy in the SNS
context,20 4 and as a result, it seems less likely that courts will be enthusi-
astic about granting protective orders in the SNS context.
Courts have explained their hesitation to recognize any legitimate pri-
vacy interests using various rationales. First, some courts have argued
that there should not be a privacy expectation for any of the content
posted on a SNS partly because the main purpose behind SNS is to share
information with others.205 Even after conceding that "it is conceivable
that a person could use [SNS] as forums to divulge and seek advice on
195. Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at *8 (quoting Rozell v. Ross-Hoist, No. 05 Civ.
2936(JGK)JCF, 2006 WL 163143, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2006)).
196. See Bass, 2009 WL 3724968, at *1.
197. Mackelprang, 2007 WL 119149, at *8.
198. Id. (emphasis added).
199. What Americans Do Online, supra note 8.
200. Baran, supra note 40, at 1679.
201. Id.
202. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
203. Kim, supra note 47, at 865.
204. See Payne, supra note 20, at 867; cf Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F.
Supp. 2d 965, 990-91 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (recognizing a privacy expectation by blocking dis-
covery through use of the SCA).
205. Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 656-57 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
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personal and private matters," one court concluded that "it would be un-
realistic to expect that such disclosures would be considered confiden-
tial. '206 Second, courts also argue that SNS users cannot have a
reasonable expectation of privacy due to the SNS's terms and privacy pol-
icies, which put users on notice that communications can be disseminated
by friends or even the SNS itself.20 7 The court argues that these "policies
should dispel any notion that information one chooses to share, even if
only with one friend, will not be disclosed with anybody else. '208 Third,
as cited by the Romano court, there is at least some precedent which has
held that e-mail and letter writers lose any expectation of privacy upon
delivery of the message.20 9 The court relied on the precedent to argue
that in the SNS context, once information is posted for someone to see,
any expectation of privacy is lost.210
A distinguishing factor in the aforementioned cases, however, was that
the courts were often refuting privacy expectations in response to argu-
ments that the information's private nature rendered it completely
outside the scope of discovery. In deciding whether to grant a protective
order, courts should be more willing to take privacy interests into ac-
count, especially when the protective order will be used merely to limit
the use and dissemination of the information. Otherwise, the result
leaves litigants highly vulnerable to the very problems protective orders
were designed to protect against-annoyance, embarrassment, and
oppression.
By failing to recognize any privacy interests at all, courts are insensitive
to the realities of SNS. SNS have versatile uses and intricate privacy set-
tings. It seems likely that reasonable people may share very intimate de-
tails of their life through the private messaging function or through some
other function that limits their communication to only a few people.
Consequently, such a blanket rejection of all privacy interests would be
incorrect when deciding whether to issue a protective order. Instead,
courts should engage in a case by case balancing test to determine
whether a certain piece of SNS information deserves protection.
Information culled from SNS discovery potentially deserves the protec-
tions from a protective order for several reasons. First, SNS bring with
them a "perceived sense of privacy. ' 211 The act of "participat[ing] in so-
cial networking encourages the revelation of intimate details about the
participant's life" such that "[d]espite the warnings and potential privacy
dangers, users reveal intimate personal information through social net-
works to fulfill their innate human social needs. '212 Second, SNS allow
206. McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 Pa. Dist. &
Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 270, at *6 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Sept. 9, 2010).
207. Id. at *7-8; see also Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 656-57.
208. McMillen, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 270, at *6.
209. Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
210. Id.
211. Payne, supra note 20, at 867.
212. Id. at 868.
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for complex privacy setting options that act as a set of controls to help
limit access to information.2 13 Since users have the ability to limit access
to specific types of information to specific users, courts should analyze
privacy expectations on a case by case basis, taking into account the pri-
vacy settings of the information at issue to make a more precise determi-
nation about whether that user could have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 214 Although the terms and use policies may try to warn users
that there is potential for their information to be made publically availa-
ble, even reasonable people may end up being misled since the site's pri-
vacy settings make statements such as "conversations within Facebook
[messages] are absolutely private. 215
Instead of wholeheartedly rejecting the expectation of any privacy in-
terests in the SNS context, judges should take advantage of their wide
judicial discretion available to issue protective orders in cases that are
most appropriate. When determining whether a protective order should
be issued, courts should weigh the hardship that would be caused to the
litigant trying to restrict access against the hardship caused by the restric-
tions on the party seeking the information. 216 In making this determina-
tion, courts should consider such factors as how many people the
information is shared with, the nature of the information (how embar-
rassing or private the information seems), the type of people the informa-
tion was shared with, and the public nature of social media itself.217 Since
protective orders often simply limit the way certain information may be
used or disclosed in the trial, rather than completely barring discovery,
judges should be more open to issuing protective orders, especially since
"[t]he federal rules recognize the value in protecting intimate information
under Rule 26(c). ' '218
3. Who Should Provide the Content?
In addition to relevancy and protective order issues, a final considera-
tion involves deciding who should provide the SNS content. There are
two basic methods to obtain SNS information. Either the producing
party can obtain the information by downloading his information from
the SNS or the producing party can request the information directly from
the third-party site. In most cases, the producing party should be re-
quired to produce relevant information directly since this is the fastest,
easiest, and least expensive method to obtain the information.
However, in some instances, it may be best for the court to require the
producing party to authorize the SNS third-party provider to turn over
the information. For example, if the opposing party fears that not all rel-
evant information is being released to them or if the opposing party
213. Id. at 869-70.
214. Id. at 870.
215. Privacy for Messages, supra note 105.
216. Payne, supra note 20, at 855.
217. See id. at 870.
218. Id. at 869.
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wants access to information that is no longer readily available on the
user's SNS profile (i.e., deleted content). Although SNS have not speci-
fied with exactitude how long they will maintain deleted information, by
obtaining the information through a request to the third party, there is at
least a chance that some deleted content might be available, although
probably difficult to obtain. 219
If for some reason, it is necessary to gain access to the information
through the third-party SNS provider, the user will need to issue a sub-
poena to the SNS provider. The subpoena process is not easy and is
likely to be met with some resistance, and thus, it is usually best to seek
the information directly if possible. 220 In fact, Facebook even states that
they "urge[] parties to civil litigation to resolve their discovery issues
without involving Facebook." 221 According to Facebook's subpoena poli-
cies, "if you are or represent a party to a civil case and believe basic sub-
scriber information is indispensable and is not within the possession of a
party, you must personally serve a valid California or Federal subpoena
on Facebook. Out-of-state civil subpoenas must be domesticated in Cali-
fornia.' '222 Furthermore, Facebook charges a processing fee of $500 per
account as well as an additional $100 for each notarized declaration from
the records custodian.223 In addition, since Facebook only guarantees
that they will release "basic subscriber information," it is unclear how
much information they will actually turn over.224
Luckily for litigants, at least one SNS, Facebook, has created a way to
make the process easier for all involved.225 Now, with just a click of a
button, Facebook users can download their entire account, which will
document anything they have ever posted on their account. 226 Other
SNS may soon realize the value in this method and potentially come up
with similar functions.
219. See Privacy Policy, supra note 1 ("Removed and deleted information may persist
in backup copies for up to 90 days, but will not be available to others."); see also Help
Center, Safety for Law Enforcers, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?safety=law
(last visited Feb. 2, 2010) ("If a Facebook user deletes content from their account,
Facebook will not be able to provide that content. Effectively, Facebook and the applicable
Facebook user have access to the same content. To the extent a user claims it does not have
access to content (e.g., the user terminated their account), Facebook will restore access to
allow that user to collect and produce the information to the extent possible.").
220. See id.
221. Id.
222. I'm Looking to Obtain Information from Facebook That Is Indispensable to a Civil
Case That I'm Involved in, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.comhelp/?faq=205949546109
965&hloc=da_DK (last visited Aug. 15, 2011).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Joel Patrick Schroeder & Leita Walker, Social Media in Civil Litigation, FAEGRE
& BENSON (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.faegre.com/12201.
226. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
In recent years and months, a slew of different decisions have arisen
from the lower courts in the United States involving the discoverability of
social media information. From these holdings, it is clear that future
courts should adopt a more uniform and sustainable approach to discov-
ery of social media information by borrowing the best practices from
some of these decisions. First, if possible, information should always be
sought first from the litigant, not the third-party SNS, to avoid possible
run-ins with the SCA. However, even if the information is sought from
the third party directly, the SCA concerns can usually be avoided by re-
quiring the SNS user to provide consent to the release of information.
Next, based on the discovery rules set forth in the FRCP, courts should
place more emphasis on the question of relevancy in determining whether
information is discoverable and less emphasis on privacy expectations in
their initial determinations. In deciding which information is relevant,
courts should leave the determination to the information-producing liti-
gant, not resort to in camera review due to the large burden it places on
judges. Finally, in general, courts should be more sensitive to the private
subject matter shared on SNS and give these privacy concerns more
weight when using their discretion to decide whether protective orders
are appropriate.
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